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The idea that mathematics is needed for our mundane everyday activities has raised the question of 
how people deal with mathematics outside the school walls. Much has been written in mathematics 
education research about the possibility of transferring knowledge from and into school. Whereas 
the  majority  of  this  literature  commends  the  possibility  of  transfer,  thus  assuming  both  the 
desirability of transfer and the importance of school mathematics for the professional and mundane 
lives of individuals, I am interested in developing an ideology critique on the beliefs underpinning 
the research on this issue. It will  be argued that the use-value attributed to school mathematics 
disavows its value as part of a political and economic structure, which requires school mathematics 
to perform other roles than the one related with utility. This critique will be illustrated through the 
exploration of a typical transfer situation between school and workplace. 
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1. Introduction
As researchers engaged in making mathematics more meaningful and pleasurable we tend to pass 
over questions whose answers are normally taken for granted. One of these questions is quite an 
elementary one: why is (school) mathematics important? The reasons may vary depending on one’s 
area  of  research.  For  some  researchers  mathematics  is  important  because  it  contributes  to  the 
development  of  higher  psychological  functions:  logical  thinking,  abstraction,  metacognition,  or 
creativity (e.g. Stech, 2008). For others the importance of learning mathematics has more to do with 
the acquisition of mathematical instruments for solving everyday problems (e.g. de Lange, 1996), 
whereas others privilege a hedonistic dimension, by emphasizing how aesthetic, pleasurable and 
attractive the learning of mathematics can be (e.g. Boaler, 2009). More recently, an emphasis on the 
cultural  importance  of  mathematics  has  been  growing,  with  researchers  stressing  the  range  of 
possibilities that mathematics offers to live it as a social,  historical and cultural experience (e.g. 
Radford, 2012). On a more critical note, some researchers emphasize how powerful mathematics 
can be in formatting reality, which requires an exploration of real mathematical models in a critical 
way (e.g. Skovsmose, 1994). Although these five areas of importance can be categorized into more 
nuanced goals of mathematics teaching (see Niss, 2007; Bishop & Forgasz, 2007), we can see how 
the importance of mathematics is invariably located in the immediate properties of mathematics. 
That is, the reasons invoked to justify the importance of mathematics in schools are conceived in 
terms  of  its  inherent characteristics,  whether  they  are  related  to  the  development  of  mental 
functions, the utility of this school subject for people’s lives, its beauty, cultural richness, or the 
ideals of citizenship. Mathematics seems to embody the right properties that make it important. 
Yet what if we conceive the importance of mathematics not in terms of mathematics itself but in 
terms of the place this subject occupies within a given structural arrangement? That is, could it be 
that mathematics is important not because of its characteristics—problem-solving, utility, beauty, 
cultural  possibilities,  etc.—but  because  of  the  sociopolitical  importance  assigned  to  it?  The 
underlying aim of this article is to probe the way in which researchers conceive the importance of  
mathematics. The fields of ethnomathematics, critical mathematics education and, more generally, 
what has been known as the  social,  cultural  and  political perspectives in mathematics education 
have  shown  how  mathematics  is  involved  in  processes  of  credibilization  and  social  selection 
(Atweh, Forgasz, & Nebres, 2001; Bishop & Forgasz, 2007; Stinson, 2004), in excluding groups of 
people  considered  to  be  disadvantaged  (Martin,  2011;  Secada,  Fennema,  &  Byrd,  1995),  in 
providing  a  clear  social  mechanism  of  accountability  (Brown,  2011),  or  in  fostering  the 
appropriation of behaviours and modes of thinking and acting that make every child governable 
(Popkewitz, 2004). These studies compel us to think about the importance of mathematics not in 
terms of object mathematics—as valuable knowledge and competence—but in terms of the role it 
plays and its attendant submissions to political as well as economic criteria and goals. However, I 
challenge the reader to find a piece of research or a national curriculum where the importance of 
school mathematics is articulated not in terms of its direct characteristics but in terms of the value it  
has  within  the  complex  universe  of  socioeconomic  relations,  a  document  saying,  for  example: 
“mathematics  is  important  because  it  allows  students  to  accumulate  school  credit  and  achieve 
higher social positions”; or “mathematics is important because it gives credibility to the course”; or 
even “mathematics is important because it allows reproduction of social inequalities”. Apparently, 
people  know  this  is  the  case.  Nonetheless,  it  is  never  stated  explicitly  in  public  discourse. 
“Officially,” the importance of mathematics is stated in terms of knowledge and competence. 
It seems that we are dealing here with two different logics of importance. On the one hand, 
there  is  the  importance  deriving  from  the  position  mathematics  occupies  as  a  school  subject 
involved in mechanisms of accreditation, social exclusion, and the like. This importance is seen as 
extrinsic to mathematics, resulting from the social role it is asked to perform. On the other hand, 
there is the importance of mathematics in itself, that is, as a key knowledge and competence for 
developing  the  student’s  personality  and  citizenship,  as  well  as  encouraging  societal  and 
technological progress. How should we articulate these two logics? One way is to oppose them, to 
conceive  the  role  assigned  to  mathematics  by  broader  politics  as  a  corrupting  force  of  the 
importance it has for individual and societal development. As a consequence, the more mathematics 
is involved in ad hoc social and political processes, the more researchers should be concerned about 
highlighting its intrinsic qualities. But what if these two logics are not opposite but complementary? 
That is, what if the discourse around the intrinsic importance of mathematics provides the ideology 
necessary for masking the political and economic importance of mathematics? This was the main 
conclusion drawn by Sverker Lundin (2012) after analysing how “word problems” are researched in 
mathematics education. Lundin concluded that the usefulness of mathematics for solving real-life 
problems is not a consequence of any direct properties of this science, but results from the workings 
of  mathematics  education  itself.  Moreover,  the  symbolic  discourse  around  the  importance  of 
mathematics for everyday activities conceals the real importance of mathematics as a testing and 
grading device. What is seen as a direct property of object mathematics—its utility—is indeed the 
result of the place mathematics occupies within the structure of capitalist economics. 
In this article I also treat the discourse around the utility of mathematics as a symptomatic case 
of an ideology set on effacing the role which school mathematics plays in political economy. By 
standing  a  certain  distance  from  the  fantasy (Žižek,  2008b)  that  extols  the  importance  of 
mathematics as use-value (Dowling, 1998)—the utility of mathematics in optimizing the mundane 
activities  of  people—,  by  refusing  to  stage  it  directly,  I  intend  to  point  to  the  system’s  own 
contradiction, to show that this fantasy is no more than the result of the activity of all of those who 
believe in it (Lundin, 2012). It is a pure fiction that simultaneously conceals its own inconsistency 
and allows it to endure. It will be argued that such fiction provides an ideological screen against the 
role school mathematics plays within the socioeconomic organization of schooling. 
I will start by discussing the importance of considering the field of economy and the concept of 
ideology when  reflecting  on  mathematics  education  as  a  field  of  research.  Both  economy and 
ideology have been disappearing from academic discourse, giving rise to new ways of mapping the 
Political  generally  associated  with  the  postmodern  trend.  As  argued  by  Eagleton  (2001), 
postmodern  theorists  tend  to  see  ideology  as  teleological,  “totalitarian”  and  metaphysically 
grounded and, as such, not useful for analysing the contingent and plural world in which we live 
today.  Grossly travestied  in  this  way,  the  concept  of  ideology has  been cutting  itself  off  from 
research in social sciences (Eagleton, 2001; Jameson, 1991; Vighi & Feldner, 2007; Žižek, 2008a), 
and economy has been relegated to one among many influential principles of society (Žižek, 2012; 
Brown,  1995).  The  disavowal  of  these  old  Marxist  categories  is  particularly  evident  in  the 
sociopolitical  turn  in  mathematics  education (Gutiérrez,  2010;  Valero,  2004).  By reducing  the 
Political  to  identity  and power  issues—what  is  called  (Butler,  Laclau,  & Žižek,  2000,  p.  202) 
“issue-oriented politics”—sociopolitical studies leaves us without theoretical tools to address the 
global economic system of capitalism and the role of school mathematics within it. Afterwards I 
review problems with the research on the use-value of mathematics, particularly the research done 
on the issue of transfer. My aim is to evidence the difficulties or even the impossibility of transfer; 
and to analyse how research conveys an ideology that forecloses such difficulties for the sake of 
school mathematics.
The second part  of  the  article  will  deal  with  the  exploration  of  a  typical  transfer  situation 
between school and workplace: young students attending a blacksmithing course with mathematics 
as  a  compulsory  subject  designed  to  be  useful  for  their  practice.  I  will  draw on  the  research 
developed by Elsa Fernandes (2004, 2008), who worked closely with the participants in this study 
during her PhD dissertation. As we shall see, although the course is designed so that students can 
learn meaningful mathematics for their work, what they end up learning is that in order to pass the 
course they have to pass mathematics which,  although useless, is presented as an indispensable 
qualification  for  a blacksmith.  That  is,  they learn  how to engage in  a  discourse without  really 
believing in it. Moreover, they learn that in order to pass the course this facade must be maintained.  
Such incongruence between what people say and what people do is in line with Žižek’s (2008a, 
2008b) theorization, the mode of ideology at work in contemporary society. 
2. Economy, ideology and the importance of researching research
The need to understand how broader ideologies  and structures impact  on what is happening in 
classrooms has been observed by some researchers (e.g.  Brown, 2011; Gutiérrez, 2010; Radford, 
2012; Valero, 2004), and is one of the main motives for the  sociopolitical turn in mathematics  
education (Gutiérrez,  2010; Valero, 2004). One of the obstacles to situating mathematics in the 
Political is related to the closure of the object of research to the learning of mathematics (Pais & 
Valero,  2012).  Another  has  to  do with  the  kind  of  theories  used in  the  field,  which  has  been 
historically grounded in mathematics and psychology (Brown, 2011; Sierpinska & Kilpatrick, 1998; 
Valero,  2004).  Acknowledging  these  obstacles,  researchers  have  been  bringing  into  the  field 
contemporary theories that, although not immediately related either to “mathematics” or “learning”, 
have  the  potential  to  enable  alternative  understandings  not  only  of  the  teaching  and  learning 
processes, but also of mathematics education as a field of research (Brown & Walshaw, 2012). 
Among contemporary  theory,  the  philosophy of  Slavoj  Žižek  and Lacanian  psychoanalysis 
have  been  used  in  mathematics  education  to  situate  the  problems  that  students  and  teachers 
experience in their daily school lives not only at a “mathematical” or “psychological” level but at a 
level where broader social systems can be taken into consideration (Brown, 2008; Walshaw, 2004). 
Furthermore, they have also been used by researchers to develop a sociopolitical critique of the way 
in which research assigns importance to mathematics as a school subject, thus contributing to the 
reflexivity of research on its discourses and effects (Baldino & Cabral, 2006; Lundin, 2012; Pais, 
2011a; Pais & Valero,  2012). This exercise in “researching research” (Pais & Valero,  2012) is 
important since many of the problems related to school mathematics cannot be fully conceptualized 
without  some  kind  of  “political  mapping”  that  situates  them not  at  the  level  of  “learning”  or 
“mathematics” but as part of the political and economic landscape of our times (Brown, 2011; Pais 
&  Valero,  2012).  Lacanian  psychoanalysis  and  Žižek’s  philosophy  have  offered  researchers 
theoretical tools not only to renew mathematics education in itself— better classroom practices, 
different understandings of what mathematics is and how it can be taught and learned—but also for 
itself, that is, to renew the way in which researchers see the importance of this school subject and 
the role of research.
Sociopolitical  studies  in  mathematics  education  have  “politicized”  a  series  of  domains 
previously considered “apolitical”  (Gutiérrez,  2010; Lerman,  2000; Valero,  2004). As I  explore 
elsewhere (Pais & Valero, 2012; and also Lundin, 2012; Klette, 2004), however, notwithstanding 
the receptiveness of the field to methodologies and theories that place mathematics education in 
relation to social, cultural and political dynamics, the fact remains that solutions to the problems of 
practice continue to be thought of in terms of practice alone. Just like the strictly “psychological” 
approach to mathematics education, within the sociopolitical turn also the possibility of calling into 
question the structure of discourse orienting research practice is foreclosed. This happens because 
the notion of the “political” within which a sociopolitical perspective operates is grounded in the 
depoliticization of research and political economy (Pais & Valero, 2012). 
How do sociopolitical  approaches disavow the political  economy? Such approaches tend to 
move from Marxist  views of  society,  where structures  are  conceived as determining individual 
agency, to critical and poststructuralist approaches where the focus is on identity and power issues 
(Gutiérrez, 2010; Valero & Stentoft, 2010). Therefore, a shift has occurred “from examining school 
structures and institutions to examining discourses and social interactions” (Gutiérrez, 2010, p. 3), 
and “educators who take a socio-political perspective stance recognize that mathematics education 
is identity work” (p. 17), engaged in transforming mathematics education in ways that privilege 
more socially just practices regarding marginalized students. This turn is in line with postmodern 
educational  discourses which conceive  change not  as a change in the totality—a change in the 
global mode of production, for instance—but as being based on local struggles which take into 
account the complexities of particular contexts (Cole, 2003; Peters & Burbules, 2004). As I explore 
elsewhere (Pais, 2011b, 2012), by emphasizing issues of power and identity, these theories disavow 
a  broader  comprehension  of  schools  as  places  of  economic  production.  Hence,  within  the 
sociopolitical turn, the problem of failure in school mathematics is understood as having to do with 
the particularities of specific groups of students considered to be at a disadvantage (Gutiérrez, 2010; 
Sriraman, Roscoe, & English, 2010)  and not so much as an all-encompassing reality permeating the 
whole  of  schooling,  thus  affecting  all students.  The  strategies  for  bypassing  failure  are  thus 
orchestrated in terms of developing better classroom strategies in order to guarantee a successful 
mathematics education for all, according to students' own particular identities. 
The idea of a central organizing principle is rejected by postmodern theorists (Lyotard, 1984; 
Seidman, 1994). Instead, they emphasize a multitude of organizing principles, what Wendy Brown 
(1995) refers to as the postmodern mantra  “race,  class,  gender,  sexuality”  (p. 61).  This debate, 
opposing the Marxian primacy of political economy and what is usually called identity politics1 is 
becoming a central one in contemporary theory. Whereas authors such as Laclau or Butler (Butler et 
al., 2000) argue that economy (particularly the notion of class) is just one type of identity politics, 
1 But also politics of recognition (Butler et al., 2000), or politics of difference (Seidman, 1994). For an account of the 
terms in which this discussion is carried out see, for example, Butler et al. (2000), Eagleton (2001) and Vighi and  
Feldner (2007); and within education Cole (2003).
and one which is becoming less and less important in the world today, Žižek (2008a) and Jameson 
(1991), in accordance with Marx, defend the opposite: economy  qua structuring principle of the 
social totality colours all other particular struggles. Making use of Hegel’s dialectics, Žižek (2004) 
describes this overdetermination carried out by capitalism as follows: “[m]ore than ever, capital is 
the ‘concrete universal’ of our historical epoch. What it means is that while it remains a particular 
formation, it overdetermines all alternative formations, as well as all noneconomic strata of social 
life” (p. 185). This is not to say that everything should be reduced to economy, thus constituting a 
vulgar Marxism. The “economic” does not stand for the entirety of social reality but is instead a 
particular element that, by being repressed, ends up determining the sphere of the Political.2 
Within  the Lacan-Žižek axis,  the status of  the “repressed” is  not one of  being outside the 
symbolic field of meaning. Rather, it is because it is repressed that it functions as the determining 
element  of  the  symbolic  tissue.  Within  current  politics,  economy  is  not  simply  excluded, 
naturalized, by an ideological formation, but stands for the necessary lack around which ideology is 
itself articulated. Except for the work of Roberto Baldino and Tânia Cabral (Baldino, 1998a, 1998b; 
Baldino & Cabral,  1998,  1999,  2006),  and,  more  recently,  Julian  Williams  (2011),  Brown and 
McNamara (2011), and myself (Pais, 2012), there has been no attempt to theorize the economic 
dimension of school mathematics. These authors are not considered to be part of the sociopolitical  
turn  (Gutiérrez,  2010;  Valero,  2004),  where  emphasis  is  given to  identity  politics.  Despite  the 
diversity of studies within the sociopolitical turn, what is common to them is a disavowal of the 
economic.3 
Central to an economic conceptualization of school mathematics is the idea that the value of 
mathematics is not inherent to mathematics, but a result of the formal place mathematics occupies 
2 The process of “forgetting” the economic cause has been a major feature not only of the postmodern trend but also of  
what Ozselçuk and Madra (2010) call “the humanist Marxism”, expressed in the work of well-known Marxists of the 
twentieth century such as Adorno, Lukács and, more recently, Habermas and Lyotard. These works read Marx in ways  
that contain or even annul the constitutive determinacy of economy. In the case of postmodernism, the Marxist primacy 
of the economic is watered down into a set of political, cultural and sexual impediments. In the case of so-called post-
Marxists, what is in fact a structural problem, endemic to a mode of production, is transformed into an abstract problem 
of  greed,  which could be  solved  by increasing  the values  of  solidarity,  trust,  sharing and general  commitment  to 
improving  the  quality  of  human  life  (Ozselçuk  & Madra,  2010).  Painted  in  this  way,  Marxism has  an  uncanny 
resemblance to a catechism, with charity as the main safeguard of humankind. Economic exploitation, the foundation of 
capitalism, is reduced to political domination, which can be solved through the goodwill of engaged people. 
3 This is also the case with the vast majority of mathematics education research (which not only disavows the economic  
but also shows a historical tendency to disavow the social and cultural dimensions, by being centred in a psychological  
approach).  As  Paola  Valero  and  I  found  (Pais  &  Valero,  2012),  even  socioculturalism  and  its  use  of  Marxist 
psychological  theories  such  as  those  of  Lev  Vygotsky  and  Alexei  Leontiev,  end  up  focusing  on the  cultural  and  
historical dimension of learning, thus completely obliterating its economic dimension. Nonetheless my criticism here  
concerns research that, although seeking to go beyond a “didactical”, “psychological” and “sociocultural” perspective 
of school mathematics, by means of emphasizing “political” issues, refrains from analysing the relation between school 
mathematics and the capitalist system.
within late capitalism. School mathematics is part of what Vinner (1997, 2000) called the school’s  
credit  system,  which  has  less  to  do  with  knowledge  and competences  than  with  selection  and 
accreditation:
I suggest that the students have very good reasons to study mathematics. It is not the necessity of 
mathematics in their future professional life or their everyday life. It is because of the selection  
role of mathematics has in all stages of our educational system. (Vinner, 2000, p. 2)
Contrary to the assumption that mathematics empowers people because it provides them with some 
kind  of  knowledge  or  competence,  Vinner  suggests  that  this  empowerment  has  instead  to  be 
understood in the field of  value. Mathematics allows students to accumulate credit in the school 
system that will allow them to continue studying and later to achieve a place in the sun.  In this 
(economic) perspective, mathematics empowers people not so much because it provides some kind 
of knowledge or competence to them but because it is posited as an economically valuable resource. 
Accepting  this  condition,  Baldino  (1998a,  1998b)  uses  the  Marxian  categories  of  use-value, 
exchange-value and surplus-value—the credentials which represent the surplus products of learning
—to show how in schools  students learn, above all, to participate in and accept the conditions of 
production and seizure of surplus-value. The value of the ones who fail is appropriated by the ones 
who pass as surplus-value.  Failure is posited as a  necessary condition for schooling: “in order to 
perpetuate  the  process  of  production/seizure  of  surplus  value,  a  certain  amount  of  failure  is 
necessary” (Baldino, 1998a, p. 5). Therefore, “failure of students means success of the institution” 
(Baldino  &  Cabral,  2006,  p.  34).  It  is  my  contention  that  failure  in  achieving  a  meaningful 
mathematics education is not a malfunction which could be solved through better research and a 
proper crew, but is endemic in capitalist schooling (Pais, 2011b, 2012).
To acknowledge that failure is a necessity of current schooling is not easy.  Somehow, one 
needs to believe that the goals for which we all strive are equity, social justice, inclusion and the 
like. We need to believe that the presupposition of the system is a “good” one, so that we can accept 
the unequal reality in which we live. In the Lacan-Žižek axis, ideology is conceived as a defence 
against some traumatic real, a “fantasy-screen” (Žižek, 2008b, p. 7) focused on restoring order to a 
situation that otherwise seems chaotic or impossible. Mathematics education research partakes in an 
ideology set  on avoiding the necessity of failure within current  schooling (Pais,  2011a,  2011b, 
2012; Pais, Fernandes, Matos, & Alves, 2012). A fantasy provides a rationale for failure. When 
confronted with the worldwide problem of failure in school mathematics and the societal demand 
for “mathematics for all”,4 research establishes an explanatory scheme within which an approach to 
the problem is proposed. Although the particular constellation of the fantasy narrative changes from 
one research  trend to  another—as  I  mentioned  in  the  introduction,  there  are  different  ways  of 
arguing for the importance of mathematics—the figure of “mathematics” functions as that which 
simultaneously thwarts the realization of the ideal goal of a universally meaningful mathematics 
and  compels  the  articulation  of  an  entire  discourse  concealing  the  necessity  of  failure  (hence 
providing researchers a frame within which to develop their work). 
Ideology  can  thus  be  conceptualized  as  a “totality  set  in  effacing  the  traces  of  its  own 
impossibility” (Žižek, 2008a, p. 50); and an ideology critique seeks not to show “how things really 
are” but rather to pinpoint what in the midst of a symbolic edifice stands for the specific exclusion, 
the pertinent lack. An ideology critique as described by Žižek is not so much about exposing what 
Engels (1968) called the “false consciousness”—where ideology is perceived as an “illusion”, as a 
mistaken, distorted representation of its social content—and goes further than Althusser’s material 
existence  of  ideology  (1994),  where  an  “external”  ritual  performatively  generates  its  own 
ideological  foundation (the case of Althusser’s famous Ideological  State Apparatuses).  Whereas 
traditional  ideology critique  seeks to  unravel  the particular  interests  behind a given ideological 
statement by analysing its inconsistencies in order to pierce the actual mode of its functioning, it  
does so in an ineffective way since—and this is the main contribution of Žižek to ideology critique
—it neglects the relation of ideology with what Lacan (2007) called jouissance or, in its anglicized 
form,  enjoyment.  Every  ideology attaches  itself  to  some  kernel  of  jouissance which,  however, 
retains  the status of  an ambiguous  excess (Žižek,  2008b,  p.  63).  What  the spectre  of  ideology 
conceals is not reality but its “repressed”, the “irrepresentable X on whose ‘repression’ reality itself 
is founded” (Žižek, 1994, p. 20). What we usually call ideology—the “hidden” agenda that reduces 
school mathematics to a mechanism of accountability and credit—is not “ideological” but  real  in 
the precise Lacanian sense: something that remains unchanged notwithstanding our awareness of it.5 
In our case, the real is the worldwide school accreditation system that is indifferent to the didactical, 
4 A slogan  propagated  in  the  last  decades  by professional  organizations (e.g.  NCTM, 2000) and researchers  (e.g.  
Presmeg, 2010) alike.
5 When Lacan (seminar of 23 April  1974, in Le séminaire, Livre XXI: Les non-dupes errant, unpublished, cited in Fink, 
1995, p. 142) says that “[t]he real is what does not depend on my idea of it”, he is pointing to the dimension of human 
subjectivity that is independent of our knowledge of it—the Freudian unconscious. Such a conceptualization is what  
allows Žižek to transpose the real  qua psychic dimension to social analysis. His argument is that we may very well 
know  that  our  economic  system  is  unfair,  that  schools  are  subjected  to  economic  pressures,  but  nonetheless  its  
functioning is real, i.e. it does not depend on our knowledge of it. The same point is made by Lundin (2012) apropos of 
mathematics education: “[m]easurements, grades, and examinations have consequences only inside the system in which 
they play a central role (...) it should be as obvious that opinions, thoughts and feelings towards this system do not  
affect its proper functioning” (p. 83).
curricular  and even cultural  innovations perpetrated by researchers,  governors and practitioners. 
What is usually seen as “ideological” is indeed the real of schooling. This repressed real, which 
stands for the economy of schooling, is simultaneously what is excluded from research and what 
gives consistency to this same research. This determination is not exerted from outside, but is a 
result of people’s own action. It is a clear indication of the material force of ideology which makes 
us reject what we see and know. This happens because for some reason we enjoy not believing in 
what we know. My argumentation intends to show that what we enjoy that hinders us from acting 
according  to  what  we  know is  precisely  the  repressed  economic  core  of  schooling.  By being 
repressed,  the  economic  accounts  for  its  efficiency.  It  functions  as  the  “concrete  universal” 
determining the relation of the subject with the real of its jouissance. 
3. The impossibility of transfer and the role of ideology
The importance attributed to the use-value of mathematics is widespread both in research and in 
curriculum-making. The importance of exploring “real-life” situations with students is associated 
with  a  more  meaningful  learning  of  mathematics,  the  development  of  competent  citizens,  the 
enhancement of general problem-solving competencies and attitudes, and the use of mathematics in 
solving problems of everyday life (e.g. Boaler, 1993; Brenner, 1998; Chapman, 2006; de Lange, 
1996; Frankenstein,  1983; Freudenthal,  1973; Gravemeijer,  1994; Niss, Blum & Huntley,  1991; 
Skovsmose, 1994). In this realistic perspective, the importance of mathematics comes not so much 
from its “internal” characteristics (as was the case with the  new math movement),  but from the 
possibility mathematics offers for people to understand and act within real-world situations. This 
view has influenced curricular changes all around the world (Blum & Niss, 1991; de Lange, 1996; 
Dowling, 1998), which can easily be seen in the curriculum guidelines from countries as disparate 
as Colombia, Portugal, South Africa and New Zealand. Evaluations of what is considered to be a 
quality  mathematics  education  seriously  take  into  account  the  capacity  of  students  to  use 
mathematics as workers and citizens (Atweh, Graven, Secada, & Valero, 2011; Bishop & Forgasz, 
2007). A global assessment programme known as PISA (OECD, 1999) has been implemented in 
the principal industrialized countries, based on the idea that students should be proficient not merely 
in terms of mastering the school curriculum but in terms of the important knowledge and skills 
needed in adult life. In research, curriculum-making and evaluation, the importance of mathematics 
for understanding and dealing with real situations—its use-value—has become a leading pillar of 
the learning of mathematics in schools. 
The belief that students should be able to apply school mathematics in real-life situations is 
supported by a considerable amount of research exploring the relation between school and out-of-
school mathematics; whether these are “crystallized” mathematics which the person needs to learn 
formally learn or “local”  mathematics which need to be recognized and included within school 
mathematics. This brings up the issue of  transfer: the use of ideas and knowledge learned in one 
situation in another (Evans, 1999). Traditional views of transfer that assume the continuity between 
school  and  out-of-school  activities  have  given  way  to  investigations  which  suppose  the 
contextuality of  mathematical  reasoning,  challenging  the  dominance  of  strictly  cognitive 
perspectives  in  mathematics  education  (Abreu,  Bishop,  & Presmeg,  2002;  Boaler,  1993,  1999; 
Evans,  1999).  Important  studies  have  indicated  that  the  mathematics  used  by children  is  quite 
different in and out of school, and that proficiency in everyday mathematics does not necessarily 
translate  to  a  good  performance  in  school  mathematics  (Abreu,  1995;  Lave,  1988;  Nunes, 
Schliemann,  & Carraher,  1993;  Saxe,  1991).  These studies  have been particularly important  in 
criticizing  the  idea  that  we  can  abstract  from the  context  some  “mathematical  task”  as  if  the 
mathematics involved were the same and thus capable of being transferred from one context to 
another  without  any  kind  of  “misrecognition”.  If  knowledge  has  no  “essence”  which  can  be 
transferred from one situation to another,  that  is,  if  knowledge is  ultimately determined by the 
situation  (Lave,  1988),  then  we  will  encounter  problems  when  attempting  to  “harness”  local 
knowledge in schools while at the same time maintaining its localized character. From the moment 
we bring the local into school, it becomes a “scholarized local”, even if the problems addressed are 
out-of-school problems (Gerofsky, 2010; Lave & McDermott, 2002; Pais, 2011a). 
As a result,  many critics  have observed that  the kind of realistic  tasks promoted by formal 
education  do  not  have  a  positive  effect  either  in  terms  of  mathematical  learning  or  in  the 
transference of knowledge to everyday situations (e.g. Boaler, 1999; Brenner, 1998; Evans, 1999; 
Verschaffel, Greer, & De Corte, 2000; Williams & Wake, 2007). As recently explored by Lundin 
(2012),  this  critique  can  take  two  different  forms.  The  more  common  one  targets  the 
implementation  of realistic  tasks,  contesting the lack of authenticity,  fidelity and realism of the 
problems and situations worked with students (e.g. Boaler, 1999;  Hoyles,  Noss, Kent, & Baker, 
2010; Skovsmose, 1994;  Verschaffel,  Greer, Van Dooren, & Mukhopadhyay,  2009; Williams & 
Wake,  2007).  The purpose of  such an approach is  to  increase the similarity  between everyday 
mathematics and school mathematics by studying under what circumstances everyday mathematics 
becomes meaningful in the classroom. On the other hand, and in a much smaller number, some 
researchers have argued that the problem is not one of implementation but one that is inherent in the 
very idea that mathematical knowledge is a useful tool for understanding and mastering the world 
outside school (Dowling, 1998; Gerofsky, 2010; Lundin, 2012; Pais, 2011a; Stech, 2008). Lundin 
(2012) suggests that the very idea of a simultaneous formation of competence to understand and 
master the world using mathematics and a perspective which shapes the world in a way that makes 
this competence relevant is peculiar to and characteristic of mathematics education research. His 
investigation bears witness to the fact that the importance of mathematics as use-value does not 
reside within object “mathematics” itself; it is, instead, the result of the subjective activity of all of 
those who assert its importance: 
While mathematics may not be very useful as a means to understand and control the social and 
physical  reality,  the  argument  of  this  article  shows that  the  very  attempt  to  make  it  useful 
contributes in a fundamental way to the very constitution of the peculiarly modern reality in 
which we imagine such use to take place. (p. 11)
The fact that modernity sees mathematics in the world results not from the real features of the world 
itself  but  from  the  workings  of  modern  institutions  such  as  mathematics  education.  It  is  the 
suggestion itself that mathematics is important for mundane activities that makes us believe that 
mathematics is indeed important for such activities.6
Studies on the relation between school mathematics and the workplace (e.g. Hudson, 2008; Riall 
& Burghes, 2000; Williams & Wake, 2007), dealing with real-world problems (e.g. Boaler, 1998; 
Brenner, 1998; Jurdak, 2006) or within ethnomathematics (Pais, 2011a), often reach the conclusion 
that  people  do  not  use  school  mathematics  in  their  daily  lives.  Rather,  they  develop  their 
mathematical skills in situ, that is, in the specific place where it is needed. Recent studies within the 
framework of activity theory often reach the same conclusion: out of school mathematics has its 
own distinct  genre,  according to  the local  practice  and its  activity  system,  the instruments  and 
division of labour and power, as well as the productive goal of the whole activity (Jurdak, 2006; 
Williams  & Wake,  2007).  According  to  Ernest (2007),  this  happens  because  the  mathematics 
behind our high-tech society is just a small  part  of the huge amount  of research being done in 
6 At stake here is what in contemporary theory is called the performative power of the word (e.g. Butler, 1997; Derrida, 
1976): reality as something which is constituted, posited by the subject. When we say that the world is written in  
mathematical language—the Galilean idea that mathematics is everywhere—we are not asserting some ontological truth 
about the world or about mathematics; rather, it is by means of our declaring it that the world becomes “written” in  
mathematics. The truth claim of a statement cannot be authorized by means of its inherent content, but results from the 
“‘rationalization’, the enumeration of a network of reasons, masking the unbearable fact that the Law is grounded only 
in its own act of enunciation” (Žižek, 2008b, p. 100).
mathematics;  some  kind  of  applied  mathematics  that  ends  up  being  routinized and  used  in  a 
“technical”  way.  This mathematics  is  learned by people in  practice,  outside school:  “[i]t  is  not 
academic  mathematics  which underpins  the information  revolution.  It  is  instead a collection  of 
technical  mathematised  subjects  and practices  which are largely institutionalised  and taught,  or 
acquired in practice, outside of the academy” (p. 31).
However,  and  notwithstanding  the  evidence  that  people  do  not  use  or  transfer  school 
mathematics  in the way desired by many researchers,  the belief  that students profit  from being 
confronted with real-life situations endures as an important argument justifying the teaching and 
learning of mathematics in schools. As symptomatically suggested by Brenner (1998), “[a]lthough 
this paper has reported on the disjunction between everyday commonsense and school mathematics, 
this  does  not  mean  that  practical  knowledge  should  not  or  cannot  serve  as  a  basis  for  school 
learning”  (p.  151).7 The  problem,  as  I  previously  mentioned,  is  seen  as  a  matter  of  (failed) 
implementation, which can be solved by means of infusing the curriculum with more open-ended 
problems (Brenner, 1998), exploring contexts that reflect realistic and complex workplace situations 
(Williams & Wake, 2007), understanding classrooms as communities of practice (Boaler, 1999), 
improving teacher education (Chapman, 2006), refining the theoretical concepts used in research 
(Evans, 1999), and using authentic learning activities and interactive software design (Hoyles et al., 
2010). In these studies the faith (Lundin, 2012, p. 8) 8 involved in the importance given to the use-
value is exposed. When researchers are confronted with difficulties in transfer, they proceed by 
7 A remarkable example is given by Jurdak (2006). After concluding that “the activity of situated problem solving in 
the school context seems to be fundamentally different from decision-making in the real world because of the difference 
of the activity systems that govern them” (p. 296), and that students “define their own problems, operate under different  
constraints, and mathematics, if used at all, plays a minor role in their decision making” (p. 296), Jurdak still insists on 
the importance of confronting students with real-life situations: “simulations of such authentic real life situations as 
embedded in situated problem solving may provide a plausible option to develop appreciation of the role, power, and  
limitations of mathematics in real-world decision-making” (p. 296). He adds, “though quite different in real life from 
that in school, the process of mathematization is  essentially the same and having experience in it in a school context 
may impact on mathematization in real life” (p. 297, my emphasis). Saying that the process of mathematization is the  
same, no matter what the context, does not sit well with the sociocultural perspective from which Jurdak writes. It is  
impossible to find support in the research reported in Jurdak’s text for such statements. The belief that the exploration  
of real-life situations in school will impact on the way in which people use mathematics in real life is based on a “leap  
of faith”, and thus constitutes ideology at its purest.
8 As observed by Lundin (2012, p. 8), “[t]he faithful finds a reason why the game is played, seemingly in reality itself, 
and at  the same time identifies a  corresponding explanation why “it  does not work””.  As a faithful  adherent,  one 
perceives oneself as the one “who knows, who sees the sorry state of mathematics education in the light of all that it  
could be, and dutifully shoulders the burden of reform”. As pointed out by Lundin, however, this attitude, instead of 
leading  to  an  amelioration  of  school  mathematics,  maintains  the  status  quo.  This  happens  because,  in  the  well-
intentioned action of improving mathematics education, the faithful fail to acknowledge, in the corrupted reality they 
lament, the ultimate consequences of their own acts. 
eliminating the obstacles, so that the higher goal of making mathematics useful for people’s lives 
can be kept. As I noted in the former section, this is the basic definition of the Lacan-Žižek notion 
of ideology: a totality set on effacing the traces of its own impossibility, by displacing the internal 
and all-pervasive uselessness of school mathematics onto an external contingent series of events 
that can be overcome through better  practices.  Instead of assuming the  impossibility of transfer 
(Evans,  1999;  Gerofsky,  2010),  research  ends  up  by  creating  an  ideology  whose  purpose  is 
precisely to disavow such impossibility. Moreover, ideology not only conceals such impossibility, it 
also creates what it purports to conceal (Žižek, 2008b, p. 6). As noted by Lundin (2012) above, it is 
the  very  act  of  making  mathematics  useful  for  people—through  the  workings  of  mathematics 
education itself—that creates the impossible “ideal” of a successful relation between school and 
out-of-school mathematics. 
4. Between school and workplace
I will now analyse a typical transfer situation involving workplace and school mathematics. The 
research reported here was initially developed by Elsa Fernandes9 in her PhD thesis. Hence, this 
particular  research  was  already  completed  when  I  started  my analysis.  My purpose  here  is  to 
analyse in a new light the data and the conclusions drawn them them by Elsa. 
During her PhD, Elsa collected data in a vocational school, in two different learning contexts: a 
mathematics  classroom  and  a  blacksmith’s  workshop  (where  students  learned  from  a  master 
blacksmith).  She  was  concerned  with  identifying  and  characterizing  mathematical  activity  that 
students used in practices not socially defined as mathematics and attempted to understand how that 
activity can be linked to the mathematics  curriculum and to their  development.  The theoretical 
framework of this research was composed of Bernstein theory and situated learning theory.
The technical blacksmith course planned by the vocational school was attended by a group of 
youths, all boys between 16 and 21 years old, who receives the minimum Portuguese wage to attend 
the course. If they successfully complete it, they will receive a diploma equivalent to the ninth grade 
(compulsory schooling in Portugal). They have to attend different classes during the week (such as 
mathematics,  English,  technical  design,  computing,  etc.),  from nine in the morning until  six  at 
9 Elsa Fernandes participates, as does the author of this text, in the project LEARN, which is one of the activities of the  
Technology,  Mathematics  and  Society  Learning  Research  Group  of  the  Centre  for  Research  in  Education  at  the 
University of Lisbon. One of the purposes of this project is to analyse, from a different theoretical perspective, data  
already collected in previous research work done by the participants in the project. 
night, and every alternate Friday or Saturday they have “blacksmith practice” in a real workshop. 
The mathematics class was designed so that the students could use the mathematical knowledge 
learned in class in their blacksmith practice, or, conversely, give mathematical meaning to some 
particular  aspect  of  their  blacksmith  practice.  Success  in  this  subject  was  necessary  for  the 
conclusion of the course.
All participants (students, teacher and master) assume the importance of mathematics as use-
value:
However,  at  the  end of  the  course,  when I  spoke with  them [the  students]  again  about  the 
importance of mathematics as a part of the curriculum, all of them were peremptory in affirming 
that mathematics was very important. (Fernandes, 2004, p. 217) 
Teacher: But a blacksmith that doesn’t know how to calculate the necessary material is a false 
blacksmith. (p. 307)
Master: They [the students] had already told me: Well, yes! We already learned this. So, don´t 
you know that? I knew, but I didn’t know that it was here where we can use it. Didn´t you know? 
So now you know! It comes from the school [the mathematics]. (p. 266)
A closer look makes us suspicious about whether the students actually  use the mathematics they 
learn in school while working as blacksmiths. Elsa’s remarks clearly point to the mismatch between 
school  mathematics  and the mathematics  students use while  performing their  blacksmith  work. 
Even though apparently we are dealing with the same knowledge, the mathematics that emerges 
from school practice is not recognized as being the same as that involved in the blacksmith activity,  
and vice versa:
When  students  were  performing  their  blacksmith  activity  they  didn’t  make  any connections 
between the mathematics that they learn in this practice and the mathematics that they learn in 
school. (p. 296)
Apprentices learn the mathematics they use while performing the blacksmith activity, with the 
other more experienced blacksmiths, and I do not have any evidence that they made connections 
between the mathematics they learn in school and the mathematics they use as blacksmiths. (p. 
368)
Alberto [One of the students] confessed that he was surprised and at the same time horrified 
when he saw that he would have to study mathematics in the course. However, when I asked him 
about the importance of mathematics in the course, he promptly answered: “mathematics is very 
important and it will help me a lot in this course. I think it makes sense to have mathematics in  
the course”. (p. 203)
One of the students, who had a lot of difficulty in learning mathematics, Alberto, said very often 
that it  was easier to construct the object referred to in the text of the mathematical exercise 
presented in the classroom, than do the calculations he was asked by the teacher to do. He also 
said that in blacksmith practice he did not need to do such calculations; he just had to build the 
object. (p. 217)
Alberto  was  unsure  about  the  importance  of  mathematics.  On  the  one  hand,  while  being 
interpellated by the researcher (whom he knew to be a mathematics teacher), he promptly stated the 
importance  of  mathematics  for  the  blacksmith  practice.  During  his  time  in  the  blacksmith 
workshop, however, he often complained about the irrelevance of school mathematics to what he 
was  doing.  Although  when  questioned  students  seemingly  acknowledge  the  importance  of 
mathematics  for their  work, when they are actually performing their  work they solve problems 
without reference to school mathematics. The question therefore arises as to why if students show 
that  they  do  not  need  school  mathematics  to  perform  their  work  as  blacksmiths  they  say 
mathematics is important? 
The nature of the students’ engagement  points towards the importance  mathematics  has for 
course completion. Despite the efforts of the teacher to make class exercises resemble blacksmith 
practices, what mobilizes students to learn mathematics is not the use they will make of it, but a 
necessity imposed by the structure of the course: 
Mathematics  was  important  because  apprentices  needed  mathematics  to  obtain  the  course 
diploma.  The  relevance  attributed  by  these  students  to  mathematics  did  not  depend  on  any 
justification  intrinsic  to  mathematics.  It  depended on the role  that  such experience  [learning 
mathematics] had regarding students’ future options. (p. 200)
For the students, being engaged in school mathematics is not related to the mathematical activity 
in itself; it depends more on the predisposition of students to engage themselves in this kind of 
activity – that is, on the likelihood of success in the subject. The motivation for this comes from 
the desire of the students to become blacksmiths and, for that purpose, they have to achieve 
success in all the school subjects that comprise the course. (p. 365)
The engagement of students in the subject derives from a will to pass and not necessarily to 
learn. As a result the mechanisms put in motion by students are not aimed at learning mathematics 
but at learning the best strategy for success. This subsidiary promotional criterion, as Baldino and 
Cabral  (1998)  call  it,  “validate[s]  non-learning  strategies  to  get  credit,  to  the  benefit  of  those 
students for whom the learning-based strategy is impossible” (p. 5). In this process, the teacher is 
many times an accomplice to students’ strategies, ending up adopting evaluation mechanisms that 
reward not the learning of mathematics but the learning of approval mechanisms. In the words of 
Baldino and Cabral (1998), the ideological relation between teacher and students can be described 
thus: 
The teacher must not know that he is there to promote this passing without knowledge. Students 
know many things, especially they know how to pass. However what they know still better is  
that the teacher wants the game to go on and things to work well.  They also know that the 
teacher does not know that this is what he wants. In order to be there, the teacher has to inebriate  
himself with his phantasm of minister of knowledge. (p. 5)
The way in which the teacher construes the exams, crucial for students’ final grades, reveals this: 
[I]n this activity [exam] students did not need to memorize the procedure because they had their 
notebooks at hand for consultation. Besides that, the final exam was done with their notebooks 
available and the tasks presented were similar to the ones students performed in class. (p. 335)
Everything seemed to be orchestrated so that students could not fail whether or not they learned 
any  mathematics.  Indeed,  taking  into  account  that  this  is  a  highly  expensive  course  for  the 
government (it involved learning spaces both in schools and in the workplace, students were getting 
paid to follow the course, many of them have a history of repeated failure in regular schooling, 
teachers were recruited especially to teach these students), it was not good for business to fail these 
people. 
5. The materialization of ideology and the real of enjoyment
Mathematics is posited as crucial knowledge to be learned by blacksmith apprentices so that they 
can become skilled workers and competent citizens. The learning of mathematics is supposed to 
occur in a meaningful way, infiltrating “realistic” situations connected with students' blacksmith 
practice. At the end, there is an assessment which decides who achieved the aims and who did not. 
It appears, however, as if there is a set of unwritten rules which, although tacit, dictates the activity 
of teacher and students. For instance, it seems as if there was something preventing the teacher from 
failing these students.10 It is as if deep down the teacher knew that some of the students would never 
achieve the mathematical learning officially required, thus watering down what students need to 
learn by doing; for instance, exams that reproduce exercises done in class or students being allowed 
10 They all passed, despite the obvious difficulties some of them, e.g. Alberto, have with the subject.
to  use their  notebooks during an exam. These unwritten rules  are,  according to  Žižek (2008b), 
fundamental in maintaining a social edifice: “[o]bscene unwritten rules sustain Power as long as 
they remain  in the shadows;  the moment they are publicly recognized,  the edifice of Power is 
thrown into disarray” (p. 93). If the official rules are to be preserved—students really have to learn 
mathematics, as well as to use the mathematics learned—the majority of students will fail, and their 
work  as  blacksmiths  will  probably  become  mischaracterized  with  the  introduction  of  school 
mathematics. It is “forbidden” not only to fail these students, but also to announce this publicly. The 
school system needs to maintain the fiction that the teacher is allowed to fail the students and that 
the lack of failures simply shows that students have effectively learned important mathematics for 
their lives. 
Instead  of  representing  simple  deviations,  unwritten  rules  are  the  fundamental  elements 
sustaining the symbolic field of a given community. Žižek (1995, p. 54) calls this the primordial lie: 
something must be concealed so that the community can constitute itself as a positive entity. In the 
case of  the community of blacksmith  apprentices,  that  which should remain  “unwritten”  is  the 
unimportance  of  school  mathematics  for  their  work.11 When  asking  blacksmith  apprentices  if 
mathematics is important for their work, although we explicitly give the opportunity to students to 
say  no,  we  already presuppose  their  affirmative  answer—they are  expected  to  say  yes.  If,  by 
chance, any of them have said no (“No, mathematics is not really important, its presence in the 
course has just to do with its credibilization”; or even: “I am aware that I don’t even have to learn 
mathematics, I just have to reproduce the solved exercises in the exam”), the social link between 
students, teacher and curriculum will be broken. Students learn that in order to become a blacksmith 
they have to pass a school subject called mathematics, which is actually of no use for their work.  
This unimportance should remain in the shadow, however;  officially all  the students accept the 
importance of mathematics for their work. 
In reality, students do not have a choice regarding the presence or not of mathematics in the 
course. From the moment they choose to do the course, mathematics is compulsory. The attitude of 
the students is one of not having any choice but to “do it”, despite its pointlessness. They adopt 
what Lundin (2012, p. 7) calls a “cynical distance”, by actively distancing themselves from the 
activity in which they participate. For the cynical, the world, or in this case the school, is a system 
“created and managed by idiots, in which we have been put and to which we have to adapt” (p. 7).  
11 But also that in order to pass in mathematics they do not really need to learn mathematics, but only to reproduce in 
the exam what the teacher performed during class; they learn the correct way to answer their teacher’s questions, and  
how to appear busy in order to avoid extra work (Fernandes, 2004). 
However, and this is a crucial point, the “‘idiots’ who ‘believe in the system’ and have supposedly 
created it accordingly, do not in fact exist” (p. 7, my emphasis). 
At issue here is the “deferential” nature of belief (Žižek, 2008b): belief is never my own belief 
but  the belief  of the Other, the belief that is supposed to be believed. In our case, the belief of 
students in the applicability of school mathematics is not really their belief, but the belief of the 
“subject supposed to believe” (p. 136), which in this case is partially performed by the teacher who 
is supposed to believe in the importance of mathematics for blacksmith practices. Although students 
know that they will not use any school mathematics in their practice, they believe that mathematics 
is important. This belief is not corroborated by their experience, but this does not prevent it from 
functioning because, in order for it to function, it is only necessary to suppose that others believe.12
Who is this “Other who believes”? As pointed out by Lundin above, this “idiot” who believes 
has no positive existence. It is a pure fiction—a fantasy—resulting from the frenetic activity of all 
of those who believe in it. Although the belief that school mathematics is useful for everyday life 
seems to falter when we get a closer look at the activities in which people are involved outside 
school, it is fuelled by researchers, teachers, and, ultimately, by students themselves. There is no 
support in the real for the assumption that mathematics is important for the mundane activities of 
people. Nevertheless, this supposition persists as a powerful argument justifying the importance of 
school mathematics. This is the fundamental level of ideology: “not of an illusion masking the real 
state  of things but that  of an (unconscious)  fantasy structuring our social  reality  itself”  (Žižek, 
2008a, p. 30). Therefore, although purely fictional, “imaginary” as Lundin (2012, p. 11) puts it, the 
ideology that asserts the importance of mathematics as use-value has real affects. It fuels an entire 
research  industry,  outlines  school  curriculums,  prescribes  classroom  work,  and  is  the  central 
measure of international assessment programmes (e.g. PISA). These endeavours can be seen as the 
“materialization of ideology in external materiality” (Žižek, 2008b, p. 2). It is not the subjects’ inner 
convictions—students know they will not use mathematics—but the external ritual—behaving as if 
mathematics is useful—that is the locus of the fantasy which sustains an ideological edifice. 
Consequently, a critique of ideology seeks not so much to disclose the “ideology” corrupting 
our practices but to show how our practices form the necessary support for this same “ideology”. 
Ideology has a paradoxical nature: it does not exist “out there”, orchestrating our lives as if we were 
12 An important distinction should be made between believing and knowing: “I believe through the other, but I cannot 
know through the other” (Žižek, 2008b, p. 138). When students say they need mathematics, this assertion belongs to the 
sphere of the (Lacanian) symbolic:  what it  really means is that students believe that others believe mathematics is  
important, and the knowledge they have of the useless character of school mathematics in their practice nobody can  
hold for them: they experience it in the (Lacanian) real. Our everyday ideological attitude consists precisely in the gap  
between (real) knowledge and symbolic (belief). Ideology structures our belief against something we know to be real. 
marionettes, but is inherently dependent on the subjects who, while not really believing in it, keep 
acting  as  if  they  do.  According  to  Žižek  (1993,  p.  202),  this  is  the  mode  of  faithfulness  to 
ideological causes, whereby the normal order of causality is inverted, since “it is the Cause itself  
which is produced by its effects (the ideological practices it animates)”. The Other who believes in 
the use-value of mathematics is not an effect of the importance mathematics has in the material 
world but is what causes this belief. 
This  is  the  reason  why  the  old  ideology  critique  based  on  the  disclosure  of  a  “false 
consciousness” is not enough: “one can know what one is doing and still  go ahead and do it” 
(Žižek, 2012, p. 983). People today know about the falsity of the ideological discourse. Researchers 
know  that  students  do  not  use  school  mathematics  outside  school.  They  know  that  school 
mathematics serves other purposes than the ones preached by research and governments in terms of 
knowledge  and  competences.  We  cannot  say  that  people  are  naive  beings,  whose  minds  are 
dominated by a false consciousness that needs to be deconstructed. When researchers know that 
people  do not  transfer  mathematics  from and into  school,  and still  insist  on the importance  of 
mathematics as use-value, they are performing what Žižek (2008b) calls a fetishistic disavowal: one 
knows, but one does not really believe what one knows, and thus keeps acting as if one does not 
know. The attachment  to a Cause (Žižek,  1993, p.  202)—in our case,  the naturalization  of the 
importance of mathematics in terms of mathematics itself—cannot be reduced to a performative 
effect of the discursive practices that refer to it. As posited by Žižek (1993):
The pure discursive effect does not have enough “substance” to compel the attraction proper to 
a Cause—and the Lacanian term for the strange “substance” which must be added so that a 
Cause  obtains  its  positive  ontological  consistency,  the  only  substance  acknowledged  by 
psychoanalysis is of course enjoyment. (p. 202)
What secures a given ideological edifice, what binds us to explicit ideologies, is not so much a 
rational decision but a mode of enjoyment. The crucial question about ideology is thus not to be 
posited in terms of knowledge—what people need to know in order to break the ideological spell—
but in terms of enjoyment: what do people enjoy that prevents them from changing? The attachment 
to something we know is “wrong” can only be explained in terms of enjoyment: after the ideology 
has been exposed we still do not change our behaviour because we enjoy it. That being so, breaking 
the ideological spell is not just a matter of knowing the ideological mechanisms that constrain us, 
but, on a more fundamental level—that is, an unconscious level—, to traverse the fantasy (Lacan, 
2007) mapping the relation of the subject with the kernel of its jouissance. Something has to change 
not just at a rational level—knowing the useless character of mathematics, for instance—but also at 
the level of enjoyment.
What do researchers and students enjoy that keeps them attached to the belief that mathematics 
is  important  for their  daily lives? Or,  in a  broader  sense,  what  do they enjoy that  keeps  them 
attached to  the belief  that  mathematics  is  important  in itself?  In the case of the community of 
“blacksmith apprentices”, students know the falsehood of school mathematics very well, they can 
even be aware of a particular interest—the credibilization of the course through the insertion of 
mathematics,  for  instance—hidden  behind  an  ideological  universality—the  importance  of 
mathematics for their work—but still they do not renounce it. Renunciation implies tearing apart the 
universality  sustaining  the  professional  course.  Nobody has  any interest  in  that,  especially  not 
students,  who see in  this  course an opportunity to  finish compulsory education.  As I  observed 
before, what students enjoy is not mathematics itself, but what circulates in the Other as school 
credit (and, in the particular case of the blacksmith apprentices, a concrete wage). In the case of 
researchers,  we cannot  be blind to the fact  that  there  are  obvious benefits  from the belief  that 
mathematics  is  precious knowledge,  a keystone of modern  society,  and an inescapable  tool  for 
citizenship.  This makes mathematics  education a privileged area of research among educational 
sciences,  with all  the concomitant  benefits  of funding,  working conditions  and possibilities  for 
research. To assume that school mathematics is more about credit than about mathematics itself 
implies  questioning  the  entire  discourse  sustaining  mathematics  education  research,  thus 
jeopardizing the central role mathematics has in education, with all the consequences this will have 
for our work. We can risk saying that what researchers enjoy is  university credit, an expression 
more  and  more  in  tune  with  the  current  functioning  of  academic  life,  where  terms  such  as 
“knowledge production”, “quotations index” and “number of publications” dictate the overriding 
goals of a whole swathe of social,  cultural  and intellectual activities previously understood and 
valued in other terms.
6. Final remarks
Albeit  mathematics  may not be very useful  as a  mean to understand the world around us,  the 
discourse on its  importance contributes fundamentally to the exceptional  utility this  science has 
within  a  school’s  credit  system.  The  more  importance  is  given  to  mathematics  in  terms  of 
intelligence, self-confidence, mastering the world, democracy and the like, the more this science is 
important as an economic instrument of social selection. Ideology produces its effect through its 
own failure so that, in the end, “one does actually meet mathematics every day and we do need 
mathematical knowledge to solve problems of this everyday life” (Lundin, 2012, p. 11). Yet that 
sort of mathematics and these problems are far from those desired by researchers. The mathematics 
is that needed to pass an exam, and the problems are those inherent in a society where access to 
privilege is justified by success in a meritocratic system. 
However  uncomfortable  it  may be,  schools  are  places  of  social  selection  and teachers  are 
agents  of  exclusion—they  are  asked,  year  after  year,  to  mark  students  with  a  grade  that  will 
determine (sometimes significantly) their future options. Apparently, there is no way of avoiding 
such  accreditation  system,  and  mathematics  education  research  ends  up  taking  it  for  granted. 
Research  then  develops  as  if  it  were  possible,  through  the  betterment  of  research  and  the 
amelioration  of  classroom  practices,  to  achieve  the  desired  equity.  If,  however,  failure  is  a 
necessary condition of today’s schooling it follows that it cannot be eradicated. My suggestion is 
that  research  should  investigate  school  mathematics  as  a  crucial  element  in  this  accreditation 
system,  rather  than  as  precious  knowledge intended  to  empower  people  and to  enable  societal 
development. 
The question of how to do it is an open one. It may well imply a complete redefinition of the 
way in which mathematics education is perceived by those who work in it, but this is the precise 
purpose of a sociopolitical approach to mathematics education (Gutiérrez, 2010, p. 20; Sriraman & 
English,  2010,  p.  25).  My only  caveat  regarding  this  approach  concerns  the  way  in  which  it 
disavows the possibility of taking school mathematics in its totality—that is, as involving both the 
ideal of “mathematics for all” and its ultimate failure. As I previously observed, the domain of the 
multitude  of  particular  “struggles”  characteristic  of  the  sociopolitical  turn  is  sustained  by  the 
repression of the role mathematics plays within capitalist schooling, where failure is a necessity. 
The reason why I find the concept of ideology so captivating is precisely because it allows me to 
address the incongruities between the official  discourse and its actualization within a life world 
context—in this case, schools. As we have seen, that which at the level of the official discourse runs 
smoothly—the argument of the utility of mathematics for becoming a worker or a citizen is well 
established—when actualized in a specific practice encounters a series of obstacles which ends up 
perverting the official intention. Usually research proceeds by eliminating such obstacles, so that 
the official aims can be fully actualized. An ideology critique is however interested in analysing 
these obstacles since they stand for the symptomatic points which allow one to grasp the political 
and economic relevance of school mathematics. My suggestion is that research should bring these 
obstacles—what I have called the unwritten rules—within its purview and investigate them not as 
correctable deviations from the official rule, but as fundamental conditions of today’s schooling. 
7. Acknowledgements
This article is part of my PhD project, supported by the Foundation for Science and Technology of 
Portugal, grant SFRH/BD/38231/2007. It is also part of the Project LEARN, funded by the same 
foundation (contract PTDC/CED/65800/2006). 
8. References
Abreu,  G.  (1995).  Understanding  how children  experience  the  relationship  between  home  and 
school mathematics. Mind, Culture and Activity, 2, 119-142.
Abreu,  G.,  Bishop,  A.,  &  Presmeg,  N.  (2002).  Transitions  between  contexts  of  mathematical  
practices. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Althusser, L. (1994). Ideology and ideological state apparatuses (notes towards an investigation). In 
S. Žižek (Ed.), Mapping ideology (pp. 100-140). New York and London: Verso.
Atweh,  B.,  Forgasz,  H.,  &  Nebres.  (Eds.)  (2001).  Sociocultural  research  on  mathematics  
education: An international perspective. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Atweh, B., Graven, M., Secada, W., & Valero, P. (Eds.) (2011).  Mapping equity and quality in  
mathematics education. New York: Springer.
Baldino,  R.  (1998a).  Assimilação  solidária:  Escola,  mais-valia  e  consciência  cínica  [Solidarity 
assimilation: School, surplus-value and cynical consciousness]. Educação em Foco, 3(1), 39-65. 
Baldino,  R.  (1998b).  School  and surplus-value:  Contribution  from a  third-world  country.  In  P. 
Gates (Ed.),  Proceedings of the First International Conference on Mathematics Education and  
Society (MES1) (pp. 73-81). Nottingham: Centre for the Study of Mathematics Education. 
Baldino,  R.,  &  Cabral,  T.  (1998).  Lacan  and  the  school's  credit  system.  In  A.  Olivier  &  K.  
Newstead (Eds.), Proceedings of 22nd Conference of the International Group for the Psychology  
of Mathematics Education (PME22) (Vol. 2, pp. 56–63). Stellenbosch, South Africa: University 
of Stellenbosch. 
Baldino,  R.,  &  Cabral,  T.  (1999).  Lacan’s  four  discourses  and  mathematics  education.  In  O. 
Zaslavsky  (Ed.),  Proceedings  of  the  23rd  International  Conference  of  the  Psychology  of  
Mathematics  Education  Group  (PME23) (Vol.  2,  pp.  57-64).  Haifa,  Israel:  Technion  Israel 
Institute of Technology.
Baldino, R., & Cabral, T. (2006). Inclusion and diversity from Hegel-Lacan point of view: Do we 
desire our desire for change?  International Journal of Science and Mathematics Education, 4, 
19-43.
Bishop, A.,  & Forgasz, H. (2007).  Issues in access and equity in mathematics education.  In F. 
Lester (Ed.),  Second handbook of research on mathematics teaching and learning (pp. 1145-
1168). Charlotte, NC: Information Age.
Blum, W., & Niss, M. (1991). Applied mathematical problem solving, modelling, applications, and 
links to other subjects—state, trends and issues in mathematics instruction. Educational Studies  
in Mathematics, 22(1), 37-68. 
Boaler, J. (1993). Encouraging the transfer of ‘school’ mathematics to the ‘real world’ through the 
integration of process and content, context and culture. Educational Studies in Mathematics, 25, 
341-373.
Boaler, J. (1999). Participation, knowledge and beliefs: A community perspective on mathematics 
learning. Educational Studies in Mathematics, 40(3), 259-281. 
Boaler, J. (2009). The elephant in the classroom: Helping children learn and love maths. London: 
Souvenir Press. 
Brenner, M. (1998). Meaning and money. Educational Studies in Mathematics, 36, 123-155. 
Brown, T. (2008). Lacan, subjectivity, and the task of mathematics education research. Educational  
Studies in Mathematics, 68(3), 227-245.
Brown,  T.  (2011).  Mathematics  education  and  subjectivity:  Cultures  and  cultural  renewal. 
Dordrecht: Springer. 
Brown, T., & McNamara, O. (2011). Becoming a mathematics teacher: Identity and identifications. 
Dordrecht: Springer. 
Brown,  T.,  &  Walshaw,  M.  (2012).  Mathematics  education  and  contemporary  theory:  Guest 
editorial. Educational Studies in Mathematics, 80(1-2), 1-8. 
Brown, W. (1995). States of injury. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Butler, J. (1997). The psychic life of power. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Butler, J., Laclau, E., & Žižek, S. (2000). Contingency, hegemony, universality. London: Verso. 
Chapman, O. (2006). Classroom practices for context of mathematics word problems. Educational  
Studies in Mathematics, 62(2), 211-230. 
Cole, M. (2003). Might it be in practice that it fails to succeed? A Marxist critique of claims for 
postmodernism  and  poststructuralist  as  forces  for  social  change  and  social  justice.  British  
Journal of Sociology of Education, 24(4), 487-500. 
De Lange, J. (1996). Using and applying mathematics in education. In A. Bishop, M. Clements, C. 
Keitel, J. Kilpatrick, & C. Laborde (Eds.),  International handbook of mathematics education 
(pp. 49-97). Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
Derrida, J. (1976). Of grammatology. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Dowling, P. (1998). The sociology of mathematics education: Mathematical myths, pedagogic texts. 
London: Falmer.
Eagleton, T. (2001). Ideology, discourse, and the problems of ‘post-marxism’. In S. Malpas (Ed.), 
Postmodern debates (pp. 79-92). Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave. 
Engels, F. (1968).  Marx and Engels Correspondence (Letter to Franz Mehring, London, July 14, 
1863).  International  Publishers.  Retrieved  from 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1893/letters/93_07_14.htm, 25 December 2012. 
Ernest,  P.  (2007).  Epistemological  issues  in  the  internationalization  and  globalization  of 
mathematics education. In B. Atweh, A. Calabrese, B. Barton, M. Borba, N. Gough, C. Keitel, C. 
Vistro-Yu,  &  R.  Vithal  (Eds.),  Internationalisation  and  globalisation  in  mathematics  and  
science education (pp. 19-38). New York: Springer.
Evans,  J.  (1999).  Building  bridges:  Reflections  on  the  problem  of  transfer  of  learning  in 
mathematics. Educational Studies in Mathematics, 39, 23-44. 
Fernandes,  E.  (2004)  Aprender  matemática  para viver  e  trabalhar  no nosso  mundo [Learning 
mathematics to live and work in our world]. PhD thesis. University of Lisbon. 
Fernandes,  E.  (2008).  Rethinking  success  and  failure  in  mathematics  learning:  The  role  of 
participation.  In  J.F.  Matos,  P.  Valero,  &  K.  Yasukawa  (Eds.),  Proceedings  of  the  Fifth  
International  Mathematics  and Society  Conference  [MES5](pp.  237-247).  Lisbon:  Centro  de 
Investigação em Educação, Universidade de Lisboa.
Fink, B. (1995). The Lacanian subject: Between language and jouissance. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Frankenstein,  M.  (1983).  Critical  mathematics  education:  An  application  of  Paulo  Freire’s 
epistemology. Journal of Education, 165(4), 315-339.
Freudenthal, H. (1973) Mathematics as an educational task. Dordrecht: Reidel. 
Gerofsky, S. (2010). The impossibility of ‘real-life’ word problems (according to Bakhtin, Lacan, 
Žižek and Baudrillard). Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education, 31(1), 61-73.
Gravemeijer, K. (1994). Developing realistic mathematics education. Utrecht: CDbeta.
Gutiérrez,  R. (2010). The sociopolitical  turn in mathematics education.  Journal for Research in  
Mathematics Education, 41(0), 1-32.
Hoyles, C., Noss, R., Kent, P., & Baker, A. (2010).  Improving mathematics at work.  New York: 
Routledge. 
Hudson, B. (2008). Learning mathematically as social practice in a workplace setting. In A. Watson 
& P. Winbourne (Eds.),  New directions for situated cognition in mathematics education (pp. 
287-302). New York: Springer.
Jameson, F. (1991).  Postmodernism or, the cultural logic of late capitalism.  Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press. 
Jurdak, M. (2006). Contrasting perspectives and performance of high school students on problem 
solving in real world situated and school contexts. Educational Studies in Mathematics, 63, 283-
301. 
Klette, K. (2004). Classroom business as usual? (What) do policymakers and researchers learn from 
classroom research? In M. Høine & A. Fuglestad (Eds.) Proceedings of the 28th Conference of  
the International Group for the Psychology of Mathematics Education [PME28], (Vol. 1, pp. 3-
16). Bergen, Norway.
Lacan, J. (2007). The other side of psychoanalysis: The seminar of Jacques Lacan book XVII [1st 
ed. 1991]. New York: Norton & Company.
Lave, J. (1988). Cognition in practice: Mind, mathematics, and culture in everyday life. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Lave, J., & McDermott, R. (2002). Estranged learning. Outlines, 1, 19-48.
Lerman, S. (2000). The social turn in mathematics education research. In J. Boaler (Ed.), Multiple  
perspectives on mathematics teaching and learning (pp. 19-44). Westport, USA: Ablex. 
Lundin, S. (2012). Hating school, loving mathematics: On the ideological function of critique and 
reform in mathematics education. Educational Studies in Mathematics, 80(1), 73-85.
Lyotard,  J.-F.  (1984).  The  postmodern  condition:  A  report  on  knowledge [1st  ed.  1979]. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Martin, D. B. (2011). What does quality mean in the context of white institutional space? In B. 
Atweh, M. Graven, W. Secada, & P. Valero (Eds.), Mapping equity and quality in mathematics  
education (pp. 437-450). New York: Springer.
NCTM. (2000). Principles and standards for school mathematics. Reston: NCTM.
Niss,  M.  (2007).  Reflections  in  the  state  and  trends  in  research  on  mathematics  teaching  and 
learning: From here to utopia. In F. Lester (Ed.), Second handbook of research on mathematics  
teaching and learning (pp. 1293-1312). Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing.
Niss,  M.,  Blum,  W.,  &  Huntley,  I.  (Eds.)  (1991).  Teaching  of  mathematical  modelling  and  
applications. Chichester: Ellis Horwood.
Nunes, T., Schliemann, A., & Carraher, D. (1993).  Street mathematics and school mathematics. 
New York: Cambridge University Press.
OECD (1999). Measuring student knowledge and skills: A new framework for assessment. Paris: 
OECD.
Ozselçuk, C., & Madra, Y. (2010). Enjoyment as an economic factor: Reading Marx with Lacan. 
Subjectivity, 3(3), 323-347. 
Pais,  A.  (2011a).  Criticisms  and  contradictions  of  ethnomathematics.  Educational  Studies  in  
Mathematics, 76(2), 209-230. 
Pais, A. (2011b). Mathematics education and the political: An ideology critique of an educational  
research field. PhD Thesis. Denmark: Aalborg University. 
Pais, A. (2012). A critical approach to equity in mathematics education. In O. Skovsmose & B. 
Greer (Eds.),  Opening the cage: Critique and politics of mathematics education (pp. 49-92).  
Rotterdam: Sense Publishers. 
Pais, A., Fernandes, E., Matos, J., & Alves, A. (2012). Recovering the meaning of “critique” in 
critical mathematics education. For the Learning of Mathematics, 32(1), 29-34. 
Pais,  A.,  &  Valero,  P.  (2012).  Researching  research:  Mathematics  education  in  the  political. 
Educational Studies in Mathematics, 80(1-2), 9-24.
Peters,  A.,  &  Burbules,  N.  (2004).  Poststructuralist  and  educational  research.  Lanham,  MD: 
Lowman and Littlefield.
Popkewitz,  T.  S.  (2004).  The  alchemy  of  the  mathematics  curriculum:  Inscriptions  and  the 
fabrication of the child. American Educational Research Journal, 41(1), 3-34.
Presmeg, N. (2010). Editorial. Educational Studies in Mathematics, 73(1), 1-2.
Radford,  L.  (2012).  Education  and  the  illusions  of  emancipation.  Educational  Studies  in  
Mathematics, 80(1-2), 101-118. 
Riall, R., & Burghes, D. (2000). Mathematical needs of young employees. Teaching Mathematics  
and its Applications, 19 (3), 104-113. 
Saxe, G. (1991). Culture and cognitive development. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Secada,  W., Fennema, E., & Byrd,  L. (Eds.).  (1995).  New directions for equity in mathematics  
education. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Seidman, S. (Ed.) (1994).  The postmodern turn: New perspectives on social theory. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Sierpinska, A., & Kilpatrick,  J.  (Eds.) (1998).  Mathematics education as a research domain: A  
search for identity. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Skovsmose,  O.  (1994).  Towards  a  philosophy  of  critical  mathematics  education.  Dordrecht: 
Kluwer.
Sriraman, B., & English, L. (2010). Surveying theories and philosophies of mathematics education. 
In B. Sriraman & L. English (Eds.), Theories of mathematics education: Seeking new frontiers 
(pp. 7-32). Heidelberg, DL: Springer.
Sriraman, B., Roscoe, M., & English, L. (2010). Politicizing mathematics education: Has politics 
gone too far? Or not far enough? In B. Sriraman & L. English (Eds.), Theories of mathematics  
education: Seeking new frontiers (pp. 621-638). Heidelberg: Springer.
Stech, S. (2008). School mathematics as a developmental activity. In A. Watson & P. Winbourne 
(Eds.), New directions for situated cognition in mathematics education (pp. 13-30). New York: 
Springer. 
Stinson, D. (2004). Mathematics as “gate-keeper”(?): Three theoretical perspectives that aim toward 
empowering all children with a key to the gate. The Mathematics Educator, 14(1), 8-18.
Valero,  P.  (2004).  Socio-political  perspectives  on  mathematics  education.  In  P.  Valero  &  R. 
Zevenbergen (Eds.),  Researching the socio-political dimensions of mathematics education (pp. 
5-24). Boston: Kluwer.
Valero, P., & Stentoft, D. (2010). The ‘post’ move of critical mathematics education. In H. Alrø, O. 
Ravn & P. Valero (Eds.),  Critical mathematics education: Past, present and future (pp. 183-
196). Rotterdam: Sense Publishers.
Verschaffel, L., Greer, B., & De Corte, E. (2000). Making sense of word problems. Lisse: Swets & 
Zeitlinger.
Verschaffel,  L.,  Greer,  B.,  Van Dooren,  W.,  & S.  Mukhopadhyay  (2009).  Words  and worlds:  
Modelling verbal descriptions of situations. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers.
Vighi, F., & Feldner, H. (2007). Ideology or discourse analysis? Žižek against Foucault. European 
Journal of Political Theory, 6(1), 141-159.
Vinner,  S.  (1997).  From intuition  to  inhibition—mathematics  education  and  other  endangered 
species. In E. Pehkonen (Ed.), Proceedings of the 21th conference of the International Group for  
Psychology  of  Mathematics  Education  (Vol.  1,  pp.  63-78).  Helsinki:  Lahti  Research  and 
Training Centre, University of Helsinki.
Vinner,  S.  (2000).  Mathematics  education:  Procedures,  rituals  and  man’s  search  for  meaning. 
Regular lecture given at the Ninth International Congress of Mathematics Education (ICME9), 
Japan.  Retrieved  from  http://www.fi.uu.nl/nwd/nwd2003/handouts/vinner.pdf,  20  February 
20012. 
Walshaw, M. (2004). The pedagogical relation in postmodern times: Learning with Lacan. In M. 
Walshaw (Ed.),  Mathematics education within the postmodern (pp.  121-140).  Charlotte,  NC: 
Information Age Publishing.
Williams, J. (2011). Towards a political economic theory of education: Use and exchange values of 
enhanced labor and power. Mind, Culture and Society, 18, 276-292.
Williams, J., & Wake, G. (2007). Black boxes in workplace mathematics.  Educational Studies in  
Mathematics, 64, 317-343.
Žižek, S. (1993). Tarrying with the negative. Durham: Duke University Press.
Žižek, S. (1994). The spectre of ideology. In S. Žižek (Ed.), Mapping ideology (pp. 1-33). London 
and New York: Verso. 
Žižek, S. (1995). The metastases of enjoyment. London: Verso. 
Žižek, S. (2004). Organs without bodies: Deleuze and consequences. London: Routledge.
Žižek, S. (2008a). The sublime object of ideology [1st ed. 1989]. London: Verso.
Žižek, S. (2008b). The plague of fantasies [1st ed. 1997]. London: Verso. 
Žižek, S. (2012). Less than nothing. London: Verso. 
